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TECHNOLOGY, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION. AND THE NATION-STATE;
A Speculative Essay
By Arthur Selwyn Miller*
In the Middle Ages3 politicians had to pay heed to the
Church. With the rise of the nation-state^  all decisions
became questions of power and national sovereignty. Now
the scientists are saying that man will survive only if
decisions are made in the light of certain scientific facts.
—London Observer, 11 June 1972,
p. 36 (discussing the United
Nation's environmental conference
at Stockholm).
We are on the edge of a new Renaissance: a new Business
Age . . . and the corporation is the rolling force. . . .
Business corporations probably will influence our lives
more than government will.
—David Secunda, Vice President,
American Management Ass'n, quoted
in Industry Week, 4 January 1971,
p. 31.
I. INTRODUCTION
If, as Ernest Nagel has forcefully argued,^ there is no simple
and at the same time adequate explanation of any social phenomenon,
one must approach the subject-matter of this essay with deliberate
*Professor of Law, the National Law Center, George Washington
University.
IE. Nagel, The Structure of Science; Problems in the Logic of
Scientific Explanation (1961)
caution and a due wariness about coming to firm conclusions. For it
deals with, two exceedingly complex matters: first, the causal
connection, if any, between technology and the rise of giant trans-
national or multinational corporations, and second, the impact that
that development is having on the political order called the nation-
state. The paper builds on previous studies by the same author
dealing with business gigantism and its implications for the socio-
political order; those studies were mainly concerned with domestic
corporations; the present essay moves the discussion to the world
arena.
In main thrust, it is suggested that modern technology permits
but does not require multinational corporate gigantism, the units of
which increasingly find the nation-state inadequate for their opera-
tions (perhaps irrelevant or a nuisance would be a better way of
characterizing them), with the ever more obvious consequence of a
marked and growing impact upon the nation-state. The economic
sovereignty of the corporations, that is to say, is now challenging—
and altering—political sovereignty. Or as Under-Secretary of State
George Ball said in June 1967: "... the structure of the multi-
national corporation is a modern concept, designed to meet the re-
quirements of the modern age; the nation-state is a very old-
fashioned idea and badly adapted to serve the needs of our present
2Miller, Toward the "Techno-Corporate" State? An Essay iii
American Constitutionalism, 14 Vill. L. Rev. 1 (1968); Miller, Corporate
Gigantism arid "Technological Imperatives." 18 J. Pub. L. 256 (1969);
Miller, Legal Foundations of the Corporate State, 6 J. Econ. Issues
No. 1, at 59 (1972).
complex world." The tensions produced by the "old-fashioned idea"
of the nation-state interrelating with the "modern concept" of the
multinational corporation, set against the imperatives of technology,
are the subject of this paper. In it, no attempt is made to distinguish
between "transnational," "multinational," or "international" corporations;
the terms are used synonymously, although it should be noted that to
date an accepted taxonomy of the larger-than-national corporate entity
4
has not been developed.
Three assumptions underlie this speculative essay. First, the
scientific-technological revolution, of which the industrial revolution
was merely an early manifestation, is comparable to the agricultural
revolution in its impact on human institutions and is the efficient
cause of a wholly new societal factor—rapid, even cataclysmic, social
change. We are, that is to say, well into a profound alteration of the
human condition, from an essentially agriculturally based social structure
to one that has science and technology as major, even controlling, factors
(and that, to some, sees these impersonal forces in religious terms of a
latter-day faith.) Second, constitutional forms of the political order
are always in a state of evolution. They are never static, whether
Ball, The Promise of the Multinational Corporation. 75 Fortune 80
(June 1967). See C. Kindleberger, American Business Abroad, (1969).
See, for example, Note, The Multinational Corporation as a
Challenge to the Nation-State, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 65 (1969); Perlmutter,
The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation, 4 Colum. J.
World Bus. 9 (Jan.-Feb. 1969).
Compare D. Schon, Technology and Change (1967) with E. Schwartz,
Overkill (1972).
"written" or "unwritten." As Frederick Jackson Turner, the eminent
historian, once said, "Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms
and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life
u £
and shape them to meet changing conditions. (A basic inquiry of this
essay is whether technology may be considered to be one of those "vital
forces," and if so, the extent to which it is altering the "constitutional
form" of the nation-state as a mode of political order.) Third, law
and the legal system are also fluid; they are open-ended, always in a
process of "becoming." Law, furthermore, is more than the "command of
the sovereign"—the Austinian view—but also the "working rules of going
concerns" that make up modern society—an Ehrlichian view; in other words,
a valid conception of law in the modern era must see it not only as a
set of interdictory rules existing in a more-or-less logically consistent
edifice of principle and doctrine, but also instrumentally—as a means
or technique of achieving desired ends. Furthermore, one must delve
beneath the surface to determine, to the maximum extent possible, how
humans order their affairs in fact as compared with the black-letter
rules. Each assumption will take on added meaning as the ensuing
discussion unfolds. I do not intend to "prove" them in the sense of
producing empirical data to validate their accuracy; that would take,
if indeed it is possible at all, more time and space than the present
study allows. They are social phenomena, and as such display inherent
complexity.
6F. Turner, The Frontier in American History, 2 (1920).
The focus below is essentially one in constitutional law and
theory. As such, it encompasses, to the extent possible, relevant
insights and data from the social and behavioral sciences. In so
doing, choices of course have had to be made from among competing
schools of thought in politics and economics, in history and sociology,
in political theory and social psychology. There is no reason to
justify why certain choices were made, other than to say that on
balance each seems preferable. Finally, since this is a speculative
essay, one that seeks to extrapolate from present evidence (often quite
scanty in amount) a possible or probable shape of things to come, its
conclusions should be considered to be tentative hypotheses rather than
existing facts. The trends that are adumbrated possibly will take a
presently unforeseeable abrupt turn in a different direction; whether
they do depends on social and political imponderables that cannot be
Q
pinned down with precision at this time.
Methodologically, this essay is an adaptation of the configurative
jurisprudence of Myres S. McDougal, who, with Harold Lasswell, has done
more than any other modern legal scholar to develop a new way of thinking
Cf. Miller, The Myth of Neutrality in Legal Research and Writing,
18 Cath. U. L. Rev. 290 (1969) (on the need to disclose value premises
from which one proceeds in legal discourse).
0
If, for example, the gloomy forecasts of the "Club of Rome"
prove to be even partially accurate, then many of the assumptions,
trends, and doctrines of the present-day political and legal orders
will have to be recast. See D. Meadows et al., The Limits of Growth
(1972); J. Forrester, World Dynamics (1971).
9
about law. In the latter part of the paper, particularly, McDougal's
conceptual schema Is employed, but in a form that I find more useful.
The basic question asked there, set within the social context in which
the problem appears, is this: Who makes what decisions, how, with what
effects? Focus will be upon the important transnational decisions, who
makes them, and their effects; the "how" is left dangling, as being
beyond the scope of this inquiry.
II. TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE MULTINATIONALISM:
IS THERE A CAUSAL CONNECTION?
To pose the question of whether there is a unilinear cause-and-
effect relationship between corporate transnationalism and the
scientific-technological revolution is to venture into the unruly sea
of social causation. That there can be no such simplistic explanation
of any social phenomenon should be so self-evident as not to require
extended discussion. What can be fruitfully done is to analogize the
growth of the multinational enterprise (the "MNE") to the way in which
a relative handful of business corporations waxed large within the
domestic American economy. One way of developing that analogy is to
assess J. K. Galbraith's The New Industrial State, in which he asserts
that it is the "imperatives of technology" which have been the most
9
The McDougal-Lasswell methodology has been outlined in a number
of places. See, for example, Lasswell and McDougal, Jurisprudence in
Policy-Oriented Perspective, 19 U. Fla. L. Rev. 486 (1966).
10J. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (rev. ed. 1972).
important cause of business gigantism in the United States, and apply
conclusions to the MNEs. Another approach could involve the develop-
ment of two major trends in the 20th century—on the one hand, the
proliferation of agreements between and among nations which evidences
a trend toward cooperation and, on the other hand, the burgeoning
growth of a transnational infrastructure consisting of larger-than-
national networks that operate both below and above the visible nation-
12
state controls. The most important, by far, of these actors in the
international arena is the multinational business enterprise, of which
at least eighty-five each have assets larger than some fifty members
of the United Nations. Each inquiry has merit, but only the first will
be discussed in this section. The net conclusion, stated now and
amplified below, is that the MNEs are made possible by developments in
communications and transportation technologies but that there is no
inevitability about them. In short, a theory of technological
determinism will not suffice to explain the rise of the MNE to prominence.
Galbraith Assessed
In Chapter II of The New Industrial State, which must be considered
to be the most popular (even influential) economics text of the modern
era, even though it has been severely criticized on several grounds,
Professor Galbraith sets forth in mercifully readable prose his
See J. Hendry, Treaties and Federal Constitutions (1955).
12
See R. Keohane and H. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and
World Politics (1972).
explanation of why the supercorporations rose and flourished within
the United States. His thesis is readily summarized. He begins by
noting the development of the Mustang automobile by the Ford Motor
Company, showing the time and cost involved, and comparing it to the
beginnings of the company (and the Model-T Ford) in the early 20th
century. In Galbraith's view, nearly "all of the effects of increased
use of technology are revealed by these comparisons." Technology, he
says, forces the division and subdivision of the application of scientific
or other organized knowledge into its component parts. Just why this is
so we are not told; his basic conclusion is stated flatly and without
13documentation: "Nearly all of the consequences of technology, and
much of the shape of modern industry, derive from this need to bring
knowledge to bear on these fractions and from the final need to combine
the finished elements of the task into the finished product as a whole."
He then lists six consequences as being of considerable significance:
(1) the time separating the beginning from the completion of any task
tends to increase; (2) an accompanying increase in the amount of capital
devoted to production may be discerned; (3) time and money tend, in
large industries, to be committed more and more inflexibly to the perfor-
mance of a specific task; (4) specialized manpower is required, those
with special skills within specific technical areas; (5) specialization
13It is worth noting that Galbraith's research, by his own admission,
was cut off at about 1957, ten years before the first edition of his
book and fifteen before the revised edition (which is substantially the
same as the first edition). See Planning, Regulation and Competition,
Hearings Before the Subcom. of the Senate Com. on Small Business, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
inevitably means that "organization" must come, for the specialists must
be coordinated; and (6) advance planning becomes a necessity, both for
the enterprise and also for the economy which is dominated by the giant
firms. In brief, Professor Galbraith believes in technological
determinism as a meaningful explanation of business gigantism within
the domestic American economy.
Galbraith*s Olympian view has all the benefits of brevity and the
shortcomings of oversimplification. Surely his theory of technological
determinism may be faulted as being lacking in empirical verification.
Certainly Professor Galbraith supplies no probative evidence to support
it. In addition, he fails to consider alternative hypotheses that seem
to have relevance to the question of a meaningful explanation of the
rise of the supercorporations. And he makes only passing mention to the
conglomerate corporation, which by no criterion can be attributed to
technological imperatives; by definition, the conglomerates are not
technically integrated. Finally, he neglects the phenomenon of corporate
multinationalism. These are only the obvious shortcomings. His thesis
is not aided by Dean Edward S. Mason's observation that "something like
the modern corporation is the inevitable product of an industrializing
society, whether that society follows a capitalist or a socialist trend
of development. Lawyers love to describe the corporation as a creature
of the law, but law in a major manifestation is simply a device for
facilitating and registering the obvious and the inevitable. Given the
technologically determined need for a large stack of capital, the
managerial requirements set by the problem of administering the efforts
of many men, and the area of discretion demanded for the effective
10
conduct of an entrepreneurial function, the corporation, or a reasonable
14facsimile thereof, is the only answer." Nor is Professor Galbraith
helped by what he calls the "convergent tendencies of industrial
societies". However different their basic ideology, he maintains that
societies produce roughly similar industrial organizations. His models,
of course, are the USA and the USSR.
But if the Galbraith thesis is questionable, what may be suggested
as alternatives? Several other hypotheses may be advanced. These
will be listed with little discussion, so as to conserve time and space.
Before doing so, however, it is appropriate to note that Galbraith's
formulation bears at least a superficial resemblance to Max Weber's
well-known hypothesis about the interrelationship between the rise of
Protestantism and of capitalism. Weber set forth his views as a
tentative hypothesis, requiring further investigation of how the
Protestant Ethic influenced the development of economic institutions.
As stated by R. H. Tawney, "Weber thought that western Christianity as
a whole, and in particular certain varieties of it, which acquired an
independent life as a result of the Reformation, had been more
18
favorable to the progress of capitalism than some other great creeds."
14
Mason, Introduction, in The Corporation in Modern Society 1
(E. Mason ed. I960) (emphasis supplied).
Galbraith, supra note 10, at 392.
In this section of this essay, I am drawing heavily on my
Journal of Public Law article, supra note 2.
17
M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
(trans. 1930).
18R. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism 5 (1926)
(pagination from Mentor paperback edition).
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Weber's two articles, published in 1904 and 1905, were attempts to test
that generalization (made, it should be emphasized, in the form of an
hypothesis, not the flat assertion of Professor Galbraith). In brief,
Calvinism and English Puritanism were of preponderant importance in
creating the moral and political conditions favorable to the growth of
capitalist enterprise.
There has been much uncritical acceptance of the Weberian hypothesis.
Among more serious students it has been the subject of intense debate.
In the main, objections to the thesis take one or more of the following
lines: (1) Weber reversed the sequence; it was not Protestantism that
promoted capitalism but rather hard-driving businessmen who wished for
moral sanction for their way of life and found it in the Protestant
Ethic; (2) religion does not explain the superior performance of
Protestant business communities as much as the status of members of
those communities as persecuted minorities; not permitted to enter many
universities or to,pursue professional careers, they turned to business,
where they worked harder than their competitors; and (3) there is no
19
empirical causal connection between business and the rise of Protestantism.
These objections, to be sure, neither prove nor disprove the Weberian
thesis. They are mentioned to indicate the type of analysis that is
necessary to provide a meaningful explanation of the growth of the
giant corporations. Weber failed to separate from the chaff of history
some of the relevant and important kernels that would bear upon his
19See, for insightful discussion, D. Landes, The Unbound
Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western
Europe from 1750 to the Present 21-3 (1969).
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thesis—for example, how the "capitalist spirit" flourished in Venice
and Florence, as well as Bavaria and Flanders, all at least nominally
Catholic. Further, he did not address himself to an even more basic
question: Why the Protestant Reformation? How can it be explained?
If Weber's hypothesis remains unproven, so too—and even more so—
is Galbraith's. His is an attempted explanation of a contemporary
phenomenon by extracting from history what he considers to be the one
crucial factor or cause. Historical explanations, however, at best
20
tend to be "probabilistic," to use Nagel's terminology. The
distinctive feature of probabilistic argumentation (and thus of historical
generalization) is that conclusions derived therefrom are not logically
required consequences of their premises. The actions (or events) that
historians try to explain could not have been predicted (that is,
deduced) from the information contained in the premises by anyone who
had access only to the information of the premises prior to those
happenings. "In point of fact," Nagel maintains, "historians are rarely
if ever in a position to state the sufficient conditions for the
occurrence of the events they investigate. Most if not all historical
explanations, like explanations of human conduct in general—and indeed,
like many explanations of concrete events in the natural sciences—
mention only some of the indispensable (or, as is commonly also said,
O -1
necessary) conditions for these occurrences.1 To take Professor
Galbraith's example of the Mustang, produced by the Ford Motor Company,
20Nagel, supra note 1.
21IcL, at 559.
13
there was no way in which people could have foreseen the coming of
Ford and General Motors and Chrysler, dominating the automobile industry,
at the time of the invention of the automobile or even at the time
of the invention of the method of production-line assembly of
22
automobiles. Galbraith's six "imperatives of technology" do not make
an oligopolistic industry inevitable nor is huge size a requirement.
There is one additional major difficulty with the Galbraithian
hypothesis: To accept it means that ipso facto one must accept giant
23
business. That is an attitude of fatalism that greatly limits the
range of policy options a given nation-state might have in effectively
dealing with the supercorporations. This will have direct bearing upon
the relationship of the transnational corporations to the nation-
states, discussed below.
That brief critique of Galbraith will serve, it is hoped, as a
means of suggesting alternative hypotheses, one or all of which may
have some bearing upon the question. They include the following; each
is set out briefly, without discussion:
1. Law and the legal system. Lawyers, with invincible parochialism,
tend to view law as being far more important than in fact it has been
and is. Some attribute a high degree of power (in a political sense) to
the Supreme Court of the United States. But law (and courts) do not have
22Cf. J. Galbraith, "Was Ford a Fraud?", in The Liberal Hour 130
(1960) (pagination from Penguin 1963 paperback edition).
23
In much the same way that Adolf Berle and David Lilienthal
counselled acceptance of the bigness of enterprise. See A. Berle, The
20th-century Capitalist Revolution (1954); D. Lilienthal, Big Business;
A New Era (1952).
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an independent force of their own; they tend to reflect, however
imperfectly, the power interests of the nation, often but not necessarily
always economically based. That, to speak sententiously, is as true
of private law as it is of public law. One may suggest the following
hypothesis: Law was used to help create a favorable societal environment
that permitted the growth of corporate enterprise; not only constitutional
law, but also the private law of torts and contracts, were employed to
further business (i.e., corporate) growth.
2. Government promotion of corporate gigantism. But technology
and the law do not, alone, explain the supercorporations. A third
possible hypothesis is this: Business gigantism is a consequence of
affirmative governmental promotion of monopoly (the term here is used,
as do Adams and Gray as well as Baran and Sweezy, as being synonymous
25
with oligopoly). If one views the history and nature of public
utility regulation, tax and expenditure policies, defense procurement
policies, disposal of surplus property, the antitrust laws, and such
specialized areas as the atomic energy industry, the conclusion is
unavoidable that government, despite protestations to the contrary, has
7 f\has in fact encouraged the growth of large business.
3. The governing-class hypothesis. However, neither the law nor
24See A. Miller, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1968).
But see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Studies 29 (1972).
05
See W. Adams and H. Gray, Monopoly in America (1955); P. Baran
and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (1966)
?fiSee P. Jones, The Consumer Society; A History of American
Capitalism (1965).
15
governmental policies, as hypotheses, pose the more basic question of
who makes and enforces the law as well as the question of how were public
policies promoting gigantism influenced and promulgated. That gap is
at least partially filled by the third hypothesis: that the super-
corporations are a resultant of a drive for economic power by the
American "governing class," with that power base being highly influential,
27
even dominant, in the making and enforcing of law and public policy.
4. The teleological hypothesis. Historian David M. Potter has
argued that the main determinant of American institutional development—
including social, economic, political, and cultural—has been the search
28for and enjoyment of material abundance. Put in the form of an
hypothesis, one may suggest, then, that the giant firm is the resultant
of the need for mass production and for a higher degree of general
economic welfare. In other words, a given community tends to create
the institutions necessary to fulfill its assumed goals within (this
is an important limitation) its capabilities or means. Said another way,
the character of society determines its economic institutions within
27See C. Mills, The Power Elite (1956); G. Domhoff, Who Rules
America,? (1967); G..! Domhoff, The Higher Circles (1971). But see A.
Rose, The Power Structure (1967).
28
D. Potter, People of Plenty; Economic Abundance and the American
Character (1954). Compare the statement of Roger M. Blough, Chairman of
the Board, United States Steel Corporation: ". . . if we look at the facts
realistically, we are bound to conclude . . . that even some of the
biggest corporations are rapidly getting too small to do all of the things
that are expected of them." Quoted in E. Penrose, The Theory of the
Growth of the Firm 264 n.l (1959).
16
the limits of its resources. Within the United States, the trend
toward social equality has produced drives that move toward mass
production and corporate gigantism.
5. The "world-frontier" hypothesis. If one ponders the implications
of an important but neglected book, Walter Prescott Webb's The Great
29
Frontier, it can then be hypothesized that the rather unique social
and environmental conditions that existed in the United States during
the latter part of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries were
a special "mix" that permitted, even encouraged, the growth of the
supercorporations. Webb's thesis is that there is a direct relationship
between the colonial expansion following the discovery of the New
World and the nature of social development in the nations of the North
Atlantic littoral. It has been suggested that had there been no
overseas expansion of the European nation-states, there would have
been no Industrial Revolution. Whether that is valid or not—it
cannot be proved or disproved—the "great-frontier" hypothesis is in
large part Turner's American-frontier hypothesis writ large. Super-
corporations, in short, are the institutions appropriate to the "great
frontier."
6. The "new transportation-communications technologies" hypothesis.
Albert Chandler has suggested that the growth of the giant corporations
was "a response to the growth of a national and increasingly urban
market that was created by the building of a national railroad network—
29
W. Webb, The Great Frontier (1952). Cf. D. North, The Economic
Growth of the United States, 1790-1860 (1961).
17
the dynamic force in the economy in the quarter century after 1880. . . .
In the twentieth century electricity, the internal combustion engine,
and systematic, institutionalized research took the place of the
national urban market as the dynamic factor in the American industrial
economy." The implication of that is that new transportation and
and communications technologies were the driving forces behind the
growth of the giant firms.
Critique and Extrapolation
The net conclusion to be derived from the foregoing is that there is
complexity—multiple causation—in the development of the corporate giant.
Each of the hypotheses may lend some partial insight, but is not by itself
adequate. Taken together, however, they tend to overlap and to complement
each other. Accordingly, it seems valid to state that the domestic
supercorporation is the consequence of the coalescence of at least the
following factors: technological imperatives; law and political
institutions; affirmative governmental policy; the interests and
actions of the "governing class"; a quest for equality and for a larger
share of material well-being; the social milieu in which the firms were
formed and grew; and new developments enormously improving the speed of
communications and transportation.
But these theses do not necessarily explain the growth of the
transnational enterprises, although, again, each may have some bearing.
30Chandler, The Beginnings of "Big Business" in American History,
in Two Pivotal Interpretations of American History 107 (C. Degler ed.
1966).
18
For Marxists, the need for new markets and also for raw materials are
31
sufficient to explain the coming of the MNEs. There may be something
to that view, but taken alone, it is not a sufficient explanation. What
can be said, and all that should be said with any degree of certitude, is
that the new technologies of communication and transportation make it
possible for enterprises to be directed and managed day by day pursuant to
plans which link the assets, wherever located, of traditional international
32
investment to others all over the globe. These new technologies have
created, in current parlance, a "global village" or "spaceship earth."
They permit changes in organization and values because they create new
possibilities for human action and thereby alter the mix of options
33
available to men. Although as Lynn White has said, "a new device merely
34
opens a door; it does not compel one to enter," that door certainly is
a clear invitation to enter. Thus it is that, to take only one example,
a major multinational company, Tradex, can operate in Geneva on a world-
wide basis, with links to plants and outlets the world over and with
instantaneous communication with the parent company, Cargill, in
Minneapolis. Without telephones and teletypewriters, to say nothing of
31See, for example, H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism; The
Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (1969); Baran and Sweezy, supra note 25.
32
See R. Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Security
(Adelphi Paper No. 74, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Jan. 1971).
33See Mesthene, How Technology Will Shape the Future, 161
Science 3837 (1968).
34
L. White, Jr., Medieval Technology and Social Change 28 (1966)
(paperback ed.).
19
airmail, without airplanes to enable key personnel to trouble-shoot
around the world, and without vastly improved cargo ships, such an
enterprise simply could not exist.
There is, on the other hand, no inexorable compulsion for it to
exist, in the sense of "technological" or other "imperatives." But it
may be taken as typical, although it is little known, of the major MNEs.
Corporate managers and owners in the United States have found the
techniques by which an enterprise can at once have centralized management
and decentralized operations. A conglomerate like ITT is similar. Tight
control can be retained over major policies, running down even into
relatively routine operational details, through a managerial hierarchy
that sees the world "as its oyster" and that considers it to be an
economic unit. Organizational techniques enable hierarchical controls
to be placed upon decentralized units of ITT—say, Avis Rent-A-Car in
western Europe.
In all of this, the nation-states—the political order—is often
found to be a nuisance the laws and regulations of which must be avoided,
if at all possible, or minimally lived with, if not. The techniques
of incorporation, particularly that most useful of inventions—that
allowing one corporation to form another or even a series of others—
enables the parent company and its managers (which, despite the
conventional wisdom of Berle and Means, quite often is controlled by
35its legal owners) to establish and maintain such a bewildering and
35
The Berle-Means thesis is disputed in, for example, R. Miliband,
The State in Capitalist Society (1969).
20
intricate variety of interlocking corporations that effective
regulation has a tendency of being minimized. The point becomes even
more apparent when one views the operations of the Delawares of the planet—
Panama, Honduras, Liberia, Liechtenstein, etc.—which readily charter
corporations or subsidiaries of other corporations as devices partially to
insulate the parent, the ultimate owner, from the nation-state, say the
oc
United States, in which it was established. The "flags of convenience"
37device of the merchant marine is merely illustrative of a larger picture.
III. THE CORPORATION AND THE NATION-STATE:
CHALLENGE AND COOPERATION
So much for prologue: Enough has been said to indicate the inherent
complexity of the question of how new technologies contribute to the
growth of multinational business. In this section, a recent statement
by Professors Joseph S. Nye and Robert 0. Keohane is used as a bridge
and a point of departure to a venture into the problem of the political
consequences of the coming of the giant MNEs: "... transnational
organizations whose principal goals are social and economic have
increased in importance. By far the most important of these organizations
is the multinational business enterprise. Multinational enterprises
existed at the beginning of this century but on a smaller scale and with
o£
See Dunning, The Multinational Enterprise; The Background in
The Multinational Enterprise 15 (J. Dunning ed. 1971).
37See, for example, McDougal, Burke and Vlasic, The Maintenance
of Public Order at Sea and the Nationality of Ships, 54 Am. J. Int'l L.
25 (1960).
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much less important effects. Modern communications technology has
greatly increased the feasibility of imposing a central strategy on
widely scattered subsidiaries and consequently has increased the
38
challenge that enterprises present to state sovereignty." What, in
other words, are the political consequences of economic power? Three
may be mentioned, as illustrative of what is occurring: (a) the
gradual but steady erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-states in
increasingly important areas; (b) the concept of "dual citizenship"
between state and enterprise; and (c) the high degree of cooperation
between enterprise and state, or, in other words, the growing fusion of
economic and political power. Each will be discussed.
Sovereignty Divided
In many striking respects, the tensions between the political order
of a plurality of the nation-states and the economic order of the MNEs
resemble the development of giant domestic corporations within the
United States and the consequent strains placed upon the traditional
notion of federalism. In both situations, the economic units span over—
transcend—decentralized political units. And in each case, historical
attributes of sovereignty (as exclusive power) have been and are
diminishing. The analogy is not exact, for the several states of the
Federal Union were never sovereign in a strict Bodinian sense, but it is
sufficiently close to provide an insight into what is occurring.
American business, small and local in 1800, became multi-state in
38Keohane and Nye, supra note 12.
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the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The history of our constitutional
law can, as Felix Frankfurter once opined, be constructed around the way
on
in which finance capitalism has developed; in no small part, changes in
federalism and in the separation of national governmental powers can be
40traced to reactions to the growth of the giant corporations. In recent
years that growth has accelerated. The result is "the new industrial
state," to use Galbraith's label, a peculiarly American form of corporativism
that has so altered the "mix" between public and private as to create a
new constitutional order. Unheralded and for the most part unchronicled,
it may well be the most significant constitutional change in American
history. That it came without amendment, but by political actions at
times given judicial approbation, at once shows the flexibility of the
Constitution and the fact that it can change by non-formal means.
The development of multistate business enterprise is merely a
prologue to the multinational or global firm. If one takes 1800 as a
point of departure, the trend is clearly toward larger size in business
units and toward expansion of the activities of those companies to
planetary dimensions. "The emergence of the multinational private
corporation as a powerful agent of world social and economic change has
41been a signal development of the postwar era." One need not subscribe
39
F. Frankfurter, The Commerce Clause Under Marshall, Taney and
Waite (1937).
40The growth of multistate business meant that no one state
could effectively regulate a corporate giant; hence, if they were to
be regulated at all, it would have to be by the federal government.
See A. Miller, supra note 24.
41Jacoby, The Multinational Corporation, The Center Magazine, May
1970, at 37 (reprinted in The Multinational Fjiterprise in Transition 21
A. Kapoor and P. Grub eds. 1972).
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to J.-J. Servan-Schreiber's thesis, propounded in his best-seller The
42
American Challenge, of the relative desuetude of the European economy
and the rise of American business in Europe as the "third most important
power in the world" to believe that the growth of multinationalism in
business is one of the most significant developments both economically
and politically (and thus constitutionally) in modern times. Richard J.
Barber put the movement in effective focus in his 1970 volume, The
43American Corporation;
The opportunities presented by the booming world economy
have been clearly recognized by American and foreign
business interests. Partly through trade but primarily
through multinational investment and operations, corporations
are becoming genuine economic citizens of the world. This
fact, with its obvious economic implications, presents even
more critical political problems for it draws into serious
question both the sufficiency and the relevance of existing
legal arrangements to control, and service, corporations
which have severed their ties with any single nation.
No longer is it accurate to think of most of our large
corporations as "American." The oil companies, the big
auto, drug, and chemical producers, and the makers of
computers and electrical equipment, among many others,
are so heavily committed to foreign markets that they have
in fact lost their U.S. identity and assumed a multinational
character. Just as regulation of business corporations by
the states became outmoded sixty or so years ago as an
integrated U.S. economy supplanted the local and regional
markets which had characterized the nation in its first
42
J.-J. Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (1969). The
"American Challenge," as Sidney Rolfe has pointed out, is really the
challenge of the multinational enterprise, the majority but far from all
of which are of U.S. origin. See S. Rolfe, The International Corporation
(1969).
43R. Barber, The American Corporation (1970); see also M. Mintz
and J. Cohen, America, Inc.: Who Owns and Operates the United States (1971)
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century, today the global scope of commercial activity
by major U.S. and foreign companies is rendering national
regulation obsolete.
With firms like Standard Oil of New Jersey, Mobil Oil,
Woolworth, National Cash Register, Burroughs, Colgate-
Palmolive, Standard Oil of California, and Singer deriving
more than half their income or earnings from "foreign"
sales, and with a long list of others, including such
familiar giants as Eastman Kodak, Pfizer, Caterpillar
Tractor, International Harvester, Corn Products, and
Minnesota Mining (MMM) making from 30 to 50 percent of
their sales abroad, even those once-American companies
are beginning to acknowledge openly—indeed with occasional
enthusiasm and a frequent boast—their new supranational
status. In explaining why it changed its corporate name
and trademark to Uniroyal, U.S. Rubber proclaimed that
"it is now meeting the research and manufacturing needs
of the whole polyglot world."
That statement by a former law professor and sometime counsel to the
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee points up two hypotheses we now advance.
44Business—the business of the "first economy" of the corporate giants—
is indeed achieving a "new supranational status." This can lead to
one of two ends (or a combination of both), when it is viewed in
conjunction with the role of the political order (the nation-states);
those possible consequences are essentially constitutional in nature.
"Inevitably," says Professor Sidney E. Rolfe,". . . the political
consequences of the internationalization of production must be faced.
This is an undefined region whose exploration is bound to be a thankless
task." To probe that terra incognita one must attempt to extrapolate
44
There are at least two economies in the United States—those of
the giant corporations, on the one hand, and of small business, on the
other. See Holton, Business and Government, in The American Business
Corporation: New Perspectives on Profit and Purpose 17 (E. Colston,
H. Morton and G. Tyland eds. 1972); M. Harrington, Toward a Democratic
Left (1968).
Rolfe, supra note 42, at 119.
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from present conditions through the use of trend analysis to postulate
possible alternative futures. One is well advised to tread lightly and
to be intellectually circumspect in that effort. Accordingly, the
following alternative hypotheses are tentatively advanced as being the
most probable; the suggestion is that one or the other—or what may be
more likely, a combination of both—will eventuate.
Hypothesis No. 1: Movement of American business abroad provides a
46basis in the living law (to adapt Eugen Ehrlich's term) for multinational
constitutionalism. As a necessary corollary, the suggestion is that the
nation-state is becoming obsolescent as a form of social order, and that
the trend is toward political integration on regional, and perhaps
ideological, bases. The essential thought here is that supranationalism
in giant business will eventually have the same effect in breaking down
national boundaries as did suprastate (i.e., multi-state) business for
American federalism.
Hypothesis No. 2; The multinational corporation will itself become
a principal instrument of governance; it will, if that be valid, challenge
the nation-state for dominance. To analogize: Just as the territorial
nation-state successfully challenged the church (in the western world)
some three or four centuries ago, and thereby became the characteristic
type of social order in the world community, so today the giant company
may well emerge victorious over the political entity.
I do not suggest that these alternatives exhaust all possibilities
See E. Ehrlich, The Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of
Law (W. Moll trans. 1936) (first published in 1912).
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of the emergent constitutional order. However, it does seem probable
that one of them will eventuate or that a combination of the two will
emerge (some sort of supra- or multinational corporate state). One
would be rash indeed to be confident in this regard. What form the
future will take is at best problematical. The forces that mold
constitutional forms and mechanisms are not necessarily within man's
capacity to control. Science and technology, as yet unharnessed, seem
likely to be more influential than other factors in shaping the future.
Compare, in this regard, two statements, the first by Dean Don K. Price,
the second by physicist Ralph Lapp: Says Price: "The main lines of
our [public] policy, over the long run, are likely to be determined by
scientific developments that we cannot foresee, rather than by
political doctrines that we can now state"; says Lapp: "No one—
not even the most brilliant scientist alive today—really knows where
science is taking us. We are aboard a train which is gathering speed,
racing down a track on which there are an unknown number of switches
leading to unknown destinations. No single scientist is in the engine
cab and there may be demons at the switch. Most of society is in the
49
caboose looking backward." The confident assertions of some
47
It should always be remembered that constitutions are as
Woodrow Wilson said, "Darwinian" rather than "Newtonian"; they are, in
other words, constantly in a process of becoming. See W. Wilson,
Constitutional Government in the United States (1908).
48D. Price, The Scientific Estate 186 (1965).
49
R. Lapp, The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Use of
Power 29 (1965).
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commentators that man can "invent the future" should be taken as statements
of a rather touching, pious faith, somewhat akin to President Nixon's flat,
unqualified comment in his 1969 inaugural address that "we have learned
to manage the economy." We have not; and indeed the invention of the
future may be a technocrat's pipe-dream. Even so, even if the future is
and will remain obscure, on the basis of present evidence the nation-
states and the corporations will vie for dominance. To speak rashly:
that contest will result in compromises being struck, in, that is to
say, a coalescence or fusion of the political power of the territorial
states and the economic power of the giant companies into a global
type of corporativism. Put another way, by the year 2000 or, say,
2020 (fifty years hence) a new form of social order will have emerged,
one that renders obsolescent the traditional nation-state. In that
process, the rise of multinationalism in business affairs will be a
major contributing factor. The nation-state, such as the U.S.A., is in
a marasmic condition—or rapidly approaching it—and the Constitution of
1787 has now become an obvious anachronism (in all save its protections
of human liberties).
If present trends continue, Professor Sidney E. Rolfe asserted
recently, the last part of the 20th century will likely be called by
future economic historians the age of transition from an international—
i.e., nationally-based—to a global economy. The image that many,
Cf. Perlmutter, The Multinational Firm and the Future, 403 Annals
139 (Sept. 1972); Perlmutter, Super-Giant Firms in the Future. Wharton
Qtly, (Winter 1968).
S. Rolfe, The Multinational Corporation (Foreign Policy Ass'n
Headline Series No. 199, 1970).
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perhaps most, people still hold of economic affairs is that of Adam
Smith and David Ricardo: The world consists of several dozen nation-
states, among which products—manufactured or primary—move relatively
freely, but with the "factors of production" (labor, capital, management)
moving only with great difficulty and perhaps not at all. That, in
Galbraith's mordant label, is the conventional wisdom. The same sort
of belief-patterns hold for the political order: The nation-state is
considered to be the most appropriate method of organizing economic
activity; one of its main functions today is to regulate, manipulate,
stimulate, and even own its industry. A final tenet in the conventional
wisdom is that the chief purpose of the nation-state in "its" economic
activities is to attain and maintain a favorable balance (a surplus) in
international payments, so as to enable it to acquire or to hold gold
(or, more recently, "paper gold"—special drawing rights (SDKs) within
the framework of the International Monetary Fund). (Just how all nations
can maintain favorable balances of payments is never explained.)
The trouble with that model is that it simply does not accord with
reality. Production of goods no longer is a purely national matter.
This is the age of international production, the instrument for which
is the multinational corporation. That it is as yet an imperfect
institution does not belie the fact that for at least a half century,
and with increasing speed in recent years, a trend toward the inter-
nationalization of production has been visible. Goods move between
nations, to be sure, but trade as such has diminished in importance;
the factors of production also move between nations. International
investment is here, apparently to stay, despite rumblings of discontent
29
52in some sectors. A new breed of corporate executive is appearing—
the multinational manager, he who really has no home because the
whole world is his home. He is based, for short or long periods, in
one place (say, Geneva); and he still doubtless retains his political
citizenship (say, that of the United States); but he is as truly an
international citizen—Arnold Toynbee once opined that they would be
53
international "civil servants" —as are, for example, the Eurocrats
who man the offices of the European Economic Community in Brussels.
Quite possibly, the multinational manager is more truly a "citizen" of
the corporation he serves than of any nation-state.
If international production is indeed here to stay, says Rolfe,
"it becomes a matter of central importance for every person concerned
with the future of his nation's or the world's economy to understand
54
what is involved." That type of production, despite Servan-Schreiber's
best-seller, is not so much "the American challenge" as it is that of
corporations which had their beginnings in a number of industrialized
nations, principally Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, Canada,.
Switzerland, and Holland, in addition to the United States. What concerns
Europeans about America, however, is that U.S. corporate investment is
concentrated in the high-technology sectors of European economies; the
most advanced industries, technologically speaking, tend to be American
52
For example, in France under Charles de Gaulle.
53Toynbee, How Did We Get This Way—And Where Are We Going?, in
Management's Mission in a New Society 16 (D. Fenn ed. 1959).
54Rolfe, supra note 51.
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(exemplifying the "technology gap" that exists across the Atlantic).
However, as Neil H. Jacoby has recently said. American business abroad
is by far the greatest single "national " enterprise. Says Jacoby:
When taken globally, it has been estimated [by Judd Polk,
director of program and studies for the U.S. Council of the
International Chamber of Commerce] that the value of the
output of all foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations was
a staggering one hundred and thirty billion dollars during
1968. This was four times U.S. exports of thirty-three
billion in that year, showing that the preponderant linkage
of the United States to other markets is foreign production
rather than foreign trade. Foreign affiliates accounted
for fifteen percent of the total production of nine
hundred billion dollars in the non-communist world outside
the United States. Thus United States industry abroad
had become the third largest economy in the world,
outranked only by those of the domestic United States and
the Soviet Union. Moreover, foreign production had grown
about ten percent a year, twice as fast as domestic
economies. Multinational corporations are rapidly
increasing their shares of the world's business.
But as noted, multinational firms come from nations other than the
United States. Historically, that was true, as with the East India
Company, which conquered and ruled India in Britain's name for
centuries. For that matter, many of the original colonies that became
states were formed by profit-seeking, joint-stock companies; Virginia,
for instance, was settled in that way. Contemporaneously, one need look
only to such giants as Italy's National Hydrocarbon Agency (ENI),
Britain's Unilever, British Petroleum, and Philips of Eindhoven (The
Netherlands) to realize that multinationalism is not a uniquely American
phenomenon. For that matter, the United States itself is now the target
of multinational investment by firms from other countries—British
55TJacoby supra note 41.
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Petroleum and Olivetti, to name but two.
The political (constitutional) consequences of the internationalization
of production may be summed up as the challenge that the corporate giant,
which exercises economic sovereignty in the world community, poses to the
nation-state, the repository of political sovereignty. The tensions,
the inevitable clashes, and the compromises struck between the two types
of sovereignty will create much, perhaps most, of the international law
in the future. The "one world" of the supercorporations confronts the
splintered world of the nation-states. Something has to give—and
something will give. That "something" will be orthodox notions of
political sovereignty.
This may be put in another way: There is a built-in dynamic in the
corporate enterprise of industrialized nations to continue expanding,
exemplifying Gunnar Myrdal's sociological "Principle of Cumulative
Causation." According to Myrdal, social affairs are never in
equilibrium; a given institution is always in a spiral upward or
downward vis-a-vis other institutions. For the Third World, that spiral
appears to be downward with respect to the nations of the "rich man's
club" along the North Atlantic littoral, W. W. Rostow's theory of
economic development, propounded in The Stages of Economic Growth.
being more fancy than fact. For corporations, on the other hand, success
begets success; in the old frontier slogan, "them as has, gits"—at least,
Set out, for example, in G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma (1944);
G. Myrdal, The International Economy (1956).
57W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (1960).
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for many of them. "The way to achieve and retain [business] greatness,"
Osborn Elliott has said in Men at the Top, "is always to be striving
for something more." That '^something more" is now making the planet
a single economic unit for a number of transnational supercorporations.
Once having made a breakthrough, certain firms become giants through a
process of upward causation. National boundaries do not confine them,
and the nation-states tend to be important only because they at times
provide some protection to them and because of largely ineffectual
attempts to regulate them. "Yet," Judd Polk commented recently, "we
find ourselves trapped in such anomalies as balance-of-payments accounting
that tends to force world operations into national perspectives. There
is a lack of intergovernmental machinery to assure suitable money and
credit conditions. The international legal structure is far from
coherent—uncertainties and conflicts of laws are a constant embarrassment
to international producers. Furthermore, conditions affecting the
operation of international companies differ—to a large extent arbitrarily-
59from country to country."
Some Basic Problems of the New Social Order
It is not too difficult to describe the nature of the modern nation-
state system and the rise of the multinational corporations. Even though
both institutions pursue secrecy policies, so that data about their
580. Elliott, Men at the Top 40 (1959).
59Polk, The Rise of World Corporations, Saturday Review, Nov. 22,
1969, p. 32.
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operations are often not obtainable, enough is known that the contours at
least, if not all of the details, can be stated. That perimeter may be
briefly sketched, with the main theme being the essential similarity
between the two characteristic entities of the day, followed by a
discussion of two of the fundamental problems of the new social order.
The peoples of the planet are governed by two overlapping, interacting
institutions: (a) the public instrument of governance, the nation-state,
plus the alliances, regional organizations, and world-wide groupings into
which nations enter; and (b) the private instrument, the voluntary
association of which the supercorporations are the most important,
which also enter into supra-corporate groupings (cartels, shipping
conferences, trade associations, etc.). They have strikingly similar
characteristics and functions. Save for the employment of violence,
the corporation is as much a government as is the nation. It allocates
resources, affects the values of hundreds of millions of human beings,
enters into alliances with other corporations and with public government
(as in concession contracts for development of extractive industries),
has an intelligence function, sets prices, carves up markets, and is
in its internal operations a political order." A. A. Berle maintained
in The 20th-century Capitalist Revolution that the international
corporation does a better job governing its part of world affairs than
does the nation-state. (In that, Berle may have been correct, but
See Timberg, The Corporation as a Technique of International
Administration, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 739 (1952); Miller, The Corporation
as a Private Government in the World Community, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1539 (1960)
A. Berle, The 20th-century Capitalist Revolution (1954).
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one surely is entitled to ask: Better for whom? and by what criteria?)
The basic difference between state and corporation is that the
former is limited geographically, whereas the latter knows few terrestrial
bounds. Both are hierarchically structured and bureacratically managed,
with the managers being technocrats (or members of a meritocracy).
Common principles of organizational behavior govern the public and
private bureaucracies. Both have an elite sitting atop each bureaucracy.
(That dual elite system, in American domestic affairs at least, is
interlocking; a flow of personnel routinely takes place between the
two organizational structures, corporate officials being a main source
of manpower for high-level governmental positions.) Almost two decades
ago Sigmund Timberg described the situation well, in an article
f\ 9
discussing the corporation as a technique of international administration.
England, Holland, and the other great trading powers
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were delegating
political power to their foreign merchants, when they
permitted those merchants to engage—collectively and
under the corporate aegis—in foreign trade. In Maitland's
classic phrase, these were "the companies that became
colonies, the companies that make war." The same proposition
holds for the modern large corporation. The modern state
undeniably delegates political power to large private
corporations, as it does to the large labor unions
with which the corporate behemoths deal. The authorization
of collective activity has, at least since the early
Christian and Jewish communities had their difficulties
with the Roman emperors, always been a state prerogative.
Furthermore, the activities authorized for a large
corporation involve such functions as price-fixing,
the division of markets, the setting of wages, and the
general development of local communities, functions
/: Q
Timberg, supra note 60, at 742-43. See also Timberg,
International Combines and National Sovereigns, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 575
(1947).
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which in a pre-Industrial Revolution era had been the
primary responsibility of the State. It has been said
of international cartels that some of the more powerful
of them "are little empires in themselves, and their
decisions are often more important than those of 'sovereign
political' entities like Holland, Denmark or Portugal."
The same could be said even more forcefully of the political
strength of that more cohesive unit, the international
combine; the notion that international combines and
cartels are strong political entities is no longer a
monopoly of the intuitively minded economist or political
scientist. Judges have described international cartels
as instruments of "private regulation," and have called
an American subsidiary the "commercial legation" of its
British parent. Even the counsel involved in drafting
international cartel agreements speak of a trade area
as so-called neutral territory, or to put it another
way as "spoils" belonging to the British and ourselves
as allies in the late war. Such a consistent use of
political terms is more than a mere metaphor; it is a
recognition of an underlying reality.
That is the political dimension. The economic sphere is equally
impressive. In terms of totality of assets, the largest corporations
overshadow most of the nation-states of the planet. Such a concentration
of economic wealth is unknown in history; it makes the supercorporation
an institution that is sui generis, one that cannot fail to have
important political—read constitutional—implications. In order to
put those implications in perspective, a brief delineation of some of
the theoretical problems brought by the rise of the supercorporations
is in order. Those problems are many, but our attention here will be
directed toward two of the more fundamental: legitimacy and accountability.
Legitimacy: If the multinational corporation does exercise power
in the political sense, then the question of the legitamacy of that
power is immediately presented. Power, to be legitimate under the
Constitution, must ultimately be responsible and accountable and must
be derived from the consent of the governed. In English history,
36
corporate legitimacy came from recognition by the sovereign; but the
corporate charter, freely granted by complaisant states within the
United States and by the Delawares of the world community—for
example, Panama, the Bahamas, Honduras, Liberia—is hardly a substitute,
The ruler in the American political order achieves legitimacy because
he has been voted into office, a condition that hardly obtains for
domestic supercorporations. Those firms are controlled by oligarchs,
whether they are public or whether they are, as in a few instances,
family-held; those in control are self-appointed and self-perpetuating.
Like boards of trustees for universities, they are responsible only
to themselves. The divorce of control from ownership, long ago
f\ ^
postulated by Berle and Means, has not yet been effectively refuted;
the rise of the institutional investor may, however, work some change—
but if it does, it will merely mean changing one set of oligarchs for
another. Dean Edward S. Mason asked in 1960: "Who selected these
men, if not to rule over us, at least to exercise vast authority, and
to whom are they responsible?" He answered the first question by
stating that it is clear that "they selected themselves," and said
that the answer to the second "is, at best, nebulous." That, in
essence, "constitutes the problem of legitimacy." It is a problem
not easily solved; it presents a challenge to constitutional theorists,
a challenge that has been little recognized or faced.
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Dean Mason was mainly discussing the domestic corporation. For
the multinational firm, the problem of legitimacy is even more difficult.
Professor Kenneth F. Boulding has put the matter well: "The international
corporation faces a peculiarly difficult problem in establishing its
universal legitimacy. Within a nation, the corporation achieves a
certain legitimacy simply from the fact that it is incorporated by
some public body. . . . The international corporations do not even
have this shred of legitimacy, simply because there is no international
body that can charter them. The international corporation, that is,
operates in a kind of governmental vacuum, and it has to depend for
its survival on legitimacies which are derived from special skill,
from bargaining power, or from the prestige of the national government
with which it is most closely associated." In other words, the
multinational corporation attains legitimacy by custom and usage—by
merely being—hardly an adequate formulation for the right or title to
rule. This is not to say that the position of business, both within
the United States and in the world community, is not solidly entrenched.
It is, but its acceptance is no longer without question. And that is
so even though as recently as 1966 Robert Heilbroner, in The Limits
of American Capitalism, could say that for "perhaps the first time
in American history there is no longer any substantial intellectual
opposition to the system of business nor any serious questioning of
65Quoted in Martyn, Multinational Corporations in a Nationalistic
World, Challenge, Nov.-Dec. 1965, p. 5.
R. Heilbroner, The Limits of American Capitalism (1966).
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its economic privileges and benefits." By 1970, publications doing
just that had begun to appear; and such activities as "Project-GM" ,
under which an attempt was made to make General Motors more responsible
to the public interest, herald a modern doubt about the sheer economic
power of the corporate giants. Ever increasingly, corporate executives
consider it necessary to justify both the existence and many of the
fifi
activities of the giant firms.00 Witness, in this regard, the severe
criticisms of Dow Chemical Company, the producer of napalm for the
Vietnam "war"; witness also the statements by Henry Ford II that the
Ford Motor Company would take the lead in alleviating pollution.
Legitimacy, then, is a problem, both domestically and inter-
nationally, of the corporate behemoth.
Accountability: To ask the legitimacy question is to ask: By
what right do you—the corporate executive—rule? Justify yourself,
in other words, on a theoretical, even abstract plane. Accountability
is much more concrete. It is the need "to answer in another place"
for decisions and actions: that is, the business officer is asked
to justify specific decisions. The power of corporate managers "is
arbitrary," says John F. A. Taylor, "quite independently of the
motives which guide them in their performances. Nothing is gained
by supposing the modern captain of industry wicked or malevolent.
Unread in the arts of Machiavelli, he could school philosophers and
See Schwartz, Towards New Corporate Goals; Co-existence With
Society, 60 Geo. L. J. (1971).
£i Q
See R. Bauer and D. Fenn, The Corporate Social Audit (1972).
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princes in the real conditioning of power.""y Under the American
Constitution, arbitrary power cannot be justified. Not only due
process of law, but the entire sweep of constitutional limitations,
is a commitment to circumscribing political power. The problem of
corporate accountability is that neither law (municipal or inter-
national) nor the market of the classical economists are adequate to
check abuses of power.
The need is for socially desirable behavior of the multinational
corporations, a proposition easy to state but difficult to define or
to explicate. No consensus exists on social desirability—not on a
planetary scale and not even on a national basis. Within the United
States, for example, there is an ambivalent attitude toward concentration
of economic (and political) power. On the one hand, the antitrust
laws are a commitment to competition and small business units; but
the way in which they are administered, as well as affirmative
governmental programs in other areas, seems at least to permit and
even encourage bigness, a sentiment approved by the Supreme Court.
In Big Business in a Competitive System, A. D. H. Kaplan maintains
that there is a schizophrenia in American public opinion, the people
wanting the results of both competition and monopoly. Berle went
so far as to say that "few of the major segments in a community really
Taylor, Is the Corporation Above the Law?, Harv. Bus. Rev.,
Mar.-Apr. 1965, p. 128.
A. Kaplan, Big Business in a Competitive System (1954).
Cf. W. Withers, Freedom Through Power (1965).
want a regime of unlimited competition."
A persistent, even wilful failure to recognize the immense economic
power of the supercorporations complicates the problem of accountability.
People insist on seeing the form or the facade, not the reality; because
the collectivities called corporations are for the most part privately
owned, they are said to be private. The result is that, save in a few
scattered instances when the Supreme Court cut through the corporate
veil and looked not to the legal theory of corporate personality but
to the social reality of collective capitalism, there has been no
effort to "constitutionalize" the supercorporations (either domestically
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or transnationally). True it is that Congress has legislated some
degree of accountability, principally in labor laws such as the Wagner
Act; the so-called "prerogatives" of management were curtailed to the
extent that corporate managers were forced to recognize collective
labor organization and to deal with the unions.
Some movement in law may thus be seen to impose norms on corporate
behavior through the medium of public law. How successful this movement
has been, or will be, cannot be gauged at this time, but surely
accountability via law presents at best a spotted picture. The unions
are not necessarily antagonistic to the companies; at worst, they
exist in tandem in a position of antagonistic cooperation. Government,
as a consequence, is forced to deal with the corporate entity as a
A. Berle, The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution 51 (1965).
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See Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State,"
10 Stan. L. Rev. 620 (1958).
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"group person," to use von Gierke's term, with management and labor
being only ostensibly at odds. Accountability by law is complicated
by a hidden affair between management and labor.
The same may be said for accountability through the operation of
the market. Under the classical theory of economics, still part of
the accepted wisdom of many professional economists, the businessman
does not have to worry about ethical or legal behavior. Acting as the
personification of "economic man," bent ceaselessly on maximizing
profit, he is considered in theory to be controlled by the "market."
The intervention of external command or government is not necessary,
simply because the "invisible hand" magically translates the pursuit
of selfish gain into the overall public good—into, that is, socially
desirable behavior. The market, in other words, is said to operate
as an external standard. By merely being, it performs a vital
societal function.
Such a simplistic model of politico-economic behavior is no
longer adequate. Likely it never was, except in the published
lucubrations of economists who sat secure in their ivory aeries
taking an Olympian and magisterial view of human affairs. The
classical market is dead, replaced by corporate planning. Consumer
74
sovereignty is a myth: Wants are created by mass advertising and
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0. von Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of the State, 1500 to
1800 (E. Barker trans. 1934). See also Latham, Anthropomorphic
Corporations, Elites, and Monopoly Power, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 303 (1957).
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by manipulation of human desire and by a socially acceptable rate of
obsolescence in consumer goods. The entrepreneur of classical economics
has largely disappeared, the Lings and Geneens of the conglomerate
corporations being only vestigial remnants of the Goulds and Vanderbilts
and Pricks and Rockefellers and the other robber barons of the 19th
century.
Socially desirable behavior of corporations concerns both those who
have an immediate and direct interest in "the" corporation—the
stockholders, the managers, the workers (both white- and blue-collar),
union leaders, suppliers, and franchise dealers—and the overall public
interest. For the former, some variation on the constitutional theme
of due process of law may well be a means, together with legislation,
75
to impose accountability norms. That, in fact, is the direction in
which public law is edging, nudged along by Congress, the Chief Executive,
and the Supreme Court. But for the latter, the problem is much more
difficult. No doubt it is valid to assert, as did Professor Grant
McConnell in his 1966 volume Private Power and American Democracy,
that a considerable part of the governing power in the United States
is influenced or controlled by "narrowly based and largely autonomous
elites." By that, McConnell meant that the voluntary associations of
America had co-opted the official governing structure and were able—
usually, at least—to have their way (or certainly to delay undesirable,
Discussed at greater length in Miller, Toward the "Techno-
Corporate" State? An Essay in American Constitutionalism, 14 Vill. L.
Rev. 1 (1958).
G. McConnell, Private Power and American Democracy (1966).
43
to them, policies for a long period). The consequence is that those
elites pursue their own special concerns and have little or no interest
in the large issues of governance. In terms of political (and
constitutional) theory this means that the pluralism of social groupings
does not redound ipso facto to the general good, Madison's warnings
against the rise of "faction," stated in Federalist No. 10, now having
become only too true.
The public interest, as President Kennedy stated in 1962, is
something more than the arithmetical sum of the private interests of
the nation. But how to enforce it, particularly with respect to
to the immense economic power of the supercorporations? There is no
easy answer to that question. That suggested here is that an inter-
national version of the corporate state is being created, one in
which the public interest is merged into a new conception. The 20th
Century is one of corporativism—domestically, ever more obviously,
and with the rise of the transnational companies, internationally
also. The public interest is the resultant of the interactions
between the important interest groups and between them and the state.
The state is at once a broker among interest groups, a participant in
the group struggle, and the target of pluralistic groups (which seek
Said President Kennedy: "... the public interest is the sum
of the private interests and perhaps it's even sometimes a little more.
In fact, it is a little more." N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 1972, p. 14. In
a somewhat similar statement, President Nixon, when speaking of the
"new economic plan," said on Oct. 7, 1971: "What is good for all of
us is good for each of us."
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to control its policies).
If the foregoing analysis is at all accurate, several conclusions
may be drawn.
1. The nation-state, although it has lost and will continue
to lose much of its economic sovereignty to the global companies, will
not wither away. It may not be the optimum political organization—
more and more sober students recognize that acting alone it is unable
to cope with most of the major problems of the era—but it will remain,
in facade at least. The companies surely are private governments in
the range and scope of their activities, but there are functions to
be performed that require institutions similar to public governments.
2. Nonetheless, with the coming of the internationalization
of production it has become obvious that the nation-state is not the
optimum political organization as it is now constituted. This augurs
for integration into regional, and possibly ideological, groupings;
the models here are the European Economic Community for Europe, and
COMECON, for the Soviet bloc. For the United States, integration of
the nations of the North Atlantic community is far from fanciful.
Already it (with Japan) has its "constitution" in the treaty
establishing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD). Not that the process of community building has proceeded very
far; but surely such existing measures as NATO (for military defense)
and the way in which European and American central bankers cooperate
78See Miller, The Constitutional Law of the "Security State,"
10 Stan. L. Rev. 620 (1958).
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in monetary matters is impressive testimony of the direction in which
political organization is moving.
3. Simultaneously, technological developments are leading
toward closer ties between nations. This may be the era of the heyday
of nationalism, but technology tends to be geo-centric. When technology
is married to business enterprise, it is more and more seen that the
optimal organization of resources and markets cuts across national
borders.
4. Within industrialized nations, of whatever ideology,
similar institutions tend to be established. There is little difference,
in this respect, between the USA and the USSR—save, and this is very
important, in who owns the enterprises. Galbraith has labelled this
the "principle of convergence" of industrialized societies, a thesis
echoed by such other observers as Raymond Aron.
5. Even with its basic commitment to private enterprise,
the United States has never been a nation in which the economic and
the political order were sharply separated. Rather, a principle of
cooperation between government and business has always existed in the
country; evidence of that principle may be found running back even
to pre-American Revolution days. Government needs business, now more
than ever; and the contrary is also true: business needs government.
The result is a "government-business partnership," a euphemism for
a native form of American corporativism that has developed slowly for
more than two centuries and that today is becoming more and more
obvious. Particularly true for domestic matters, it is not invalid
in the world community. We are ruled by two systems of governance—
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the territorial nation-state and the economic entity—acting together.
The public interest is what is good for the "group-person"—that new
form of social order.
6. The consequences for American constitutionalism are
several—and profound. They include: (a) federalism will become
even more moribund, despite a latter-day movement toward "participatory
democracy"; the most significant units of our federal system will be
"functional"—the corporations (and other pluralistic groups); (b) more
power will flow to the executive-administrative branch, with both
Congress and the courts suffering a marked diminution of status; the
modern state is the adminis-state, and all modern governments,
including that of the United States, are dominated by the Executive;
(c) in public policy matters, the lines between public and private
and between foreign and domestic will ever increasingly be blurred;
at times they will even be erased; and (d) the Constitution, through
some means, must be able either to work extraterritorially or it
will gradually sink into oblivion. This last proposition, admittedly
controversial, merits separate treatment.
7. The basic question is: How can an essentially domestically
oriented Constitution be made to operate in a situation when most,
perhaps all, public policy questions have significant, even controlling,
foreign or international dimensions? No ready answer to that question
is available. As a preliminary matter, one can ask whether any of the
four methods of constitutional change is sufficient to the need. Can
the Constitution be adapted to an interdependent world without
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79thoroughgoing revision? The answer is: Possibly.
Amendment, of course, is always possible, even to the extent of
entirely rewriting the Constitution. But it is a highly improbable
technique. Much more probable is a combination of the other three
methods—custom and usage (as in international monetary matters
today), political actions (the treaty establishing the OECD provides
an example, despite some precautionary language inserted by the
Senate in its consent to ratification), and judicial action (or
possibly inaction, since much of American foreign affairs does not
get before the courts). A commitment to political integration by
slow stages with the nations of the North Atlantic community does
seem possible without an amendment, and even though ultimately it
would mean supranationalism on a large scale. Already this has
been done in small measure in international commodity agreements and
in the workings of the International Monetary Fund, both of which
have a degree of supranationalism. The same may be said for NATO,
in the routine operations of which a good deal of international
administration is accomplished.
A revolution to supranationalism, on an ad hoc, piece by piece
basis would not be more startling than the constitutional revolution
of the 1930's that changed the United States, firmly and irreversibly,
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to the Positive State. That was accomplished without amendment,
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For an adumbration of the methods of constitutional change,
see Miller, Change and the Constitution, 1970 Law and the Social
Order 231.
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The concept of the "positive state" is outlined in A. Miller,
The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1968).
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but by political programs backed by judicial approbation (sometimes
silent, as with the Employment Act of 1946). The massive changes
that have taken place in the American constitutional order, mainly
without amendment, provide impressive testimony to the notion that
even such an alteration as is here postulated could be done.
This has been a brief inquiry into the implications of the
impact of corporate supranationalism on the American constitutional
order. That sovereignty is shared in the world arena, that there is
a fusion of economic and political power, needs little documentation.
That the next generation of American constitutional lawyers must be
concerned with the economic (and political) power of the overmighty
economic sovereignties called corporations seems obvious. They are
providing a basis in the living law of society for some sort of
multinational constitutionalism. The nation-state, even such a super-
power as the United States, is, accordingly, in a marasmic state.
It will not, it should be iterated, disappear, for it has its
indispensable functions to perform, functions that the corporations
(and other groups) simply do not want to, or cannot, do. But in its
historical form at least, surely it is not the optimum political
order. At one time the church dominated the Western world, only to
be supplanted by the nation-state. Now the latter is evolving into
something new; that, we call multinational corporativism (it is
discussed more fully below).
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Corporate Citizenship
The notion of citizenship of the corporation, of allegiances being
owed to an inchoate collective body, has been mentioned above. The
present discussion develops that idea further. Citizenship so
considered must of course be based upon a theory of political organization
on a functional or occupational-industrial basis rather than on a
81
geographic basis. The principal hypothesis here advanced is that
citizenship of the international corporate manager, and indeed of
members of the techno-structure far down the corporate hierarchy, is
tending to become dual; allegiances are owed in part to the nation-
state and in part to the corporation.
Under the orthodox view, citizenship attaches merely to the
political order; by birth or by blood or by naturalization, one
achieves a certain status conferred by the state. Normally, this
relates only to the territorial nation-state. However, in some
instances dual nationality (or citizenship) is possible; some
states permit one to renounce his citizenship to take on another,
whereas others refuse to allow voluntary divestiture. (There is a
considerable body of American constitutional law on the question of
£2
involuntary loss of citizenship.) And in what seems to be a unique
81As such it bears resemblance to theories of syndicalism and
corporativism. See, inter alia, M. Olson, The Logic of Collective
Action (1965); M. Elbow, French Corporative Theory, 1789-1948 (1953)
82For discussion, see, for example, Roche, The Expatriation
Cases; "Breathes There the Man, with Soul So Dead . . .?, 1963 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 325.
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situation, the state of Israel claims that Jews everywhere are also
citizens of Israel, simply because of religious ties, regardless of
83
whether or not an individual wishes it.
The unresolved, threshold question is whether a person can be
considered to be a citizen of both the territorial state and a non-
geographic entity, such as the corporation. The answer suggested
here is in the affirmative. If the corporation is viewed, as indeed
it should be, as something more than an economic entity or a constitutional
(legal) person, but also as a political order and a social system,
then it becomes obvious, as Andrew Hacker has said, that the time
has come "for us to recognize a new kind of citizenship: corporation
84
citizenship."
The late Charles Wilson, of General Motors, is famed for a
misquoted malapropism which had him identifying the interests of GM
with those of the United States. But he was, and is, not alone in
that belief: Corporate managers readily perceive the "public
interest" being furthered by their activities; employing the
comforting, however erroneous, theories of Adam Smith, they are able
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to translate individual (natural person and corporation) greed or
self-interest into the public good. On the other hand, as David
Finn has said, "not only personal concerns but the special interests
of individual departments or subsidiaries must be subordinated to the
o c
good of the company as a whole." Over-all company goals are
rigorously, even ruthlessly, pursued.
If citizenship is viewed functionally, rather than as an attribute
of positive law (as, that is, a characteristic that can be conferred
only by the state), then it is necessary to ask for the factors that
make up citizenship. There is a dual aspect to that question:
(a) With whom does the individual person identify? which organization
commands his loyalties and allegiances? (b) What type of reciprocal
obligations flow from the organization to the individual? This is
not the place to do more than pose such questions; they will require
answer in another place. Suffice it now merely to quote Hacker
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again:
. . . managers and workers alike are uprooted, but
it is the former—the middle class—who seek adjustment
and new roots because of the profound changes they have
undergone in environment, expectations, and status.
Eastman Kodak's medical plans, IBM's country clubs,
Richfield Oil's model homes, du Font's psychiatrists,
Reynolds Tobacco's chaplains, and even RCA's neckties
with the corporate insignia—all are symptomatic of the
effort to establish a feeling of community within the
corporation. The middle-class employee no longer has
an alternative community in which he can find a sense
of belonging. The national government is too large and
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unwieldly to provide this satisfaction; and local
governments are too ineffectual to cater to such deep-
seated needs. Government provides various welfare
services at various levels, but they are far from being
programs that will meet the social and psychological
needs of the middle class.
Thus there has emerged the equivalent of a new kind
of citizenship. It is not the same as our traditional
view of citizenship ....
Hacker, of course, speaks here of the domestic corporation. If his
views are valid, as I believe they are, then they are applicable with
even greater force to the MNEs. Those who toil and spin for the MNEs
are a part of a community, non-geographical but nevertheless identifiable,
that has its rewards and punishments and, even more importantly, gives
satisfactions greater than the orthodox political order.
The state, to be sure, claims and attempts to enforce a monopoly
on loyalty. But this is a relatively new development in Western
87
history, as Robert Nisbet has forcefully demonstrated. And to the
extent that it had force and effect in international law, it has
broken down in recent years. The United Nations, for example, was
recognized as an international public body by the International Court
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of Justice. The subjects of international law are no longer
limited to nation-states; in the words of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, "Practice has abandoned the doctrine that States
87
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are the exclusive subjects of international rights and duties."
Transnational organizations that are beginning to achieve
recognition as international public bodies include the Knights of
90
Malta, the Ismaili sect, and the Roman Catholic Church.
The clear implication of calling the United Nations a subject
of international law, as was done in the United Nations Reparation
Case, plus the dawning recognition of bodies other than nation-states
as subjects of international law, is that reciprocal rights and duties
attach to those who identify with these new subjects. In traditional
legal parlance, those rights and duties, as well as the identifications
with non-nation groups, bespeak nationality or citizenship.
Functionally, this is a practical consideration, as Professor Helen
91Silving has said: "Nationality law is closely connected with the
political structure of country, more so than most branches of law. It
determines who should be a 'citizen,' and thus what shall be the
composition of the 'nation'." Or as the Supreme Court of the United
States said in 1913: "Citizenship is membership in a political society
and implies a duty of allegiance on the part of the member and a duty
of protection on the part of society. These are reciprocal obligations,
89
Memo, of Sec. Gen. of U.N., in Survey of Int'l Law in Relation
to the Work of Codification of the Int'l Law Comm'n, A/cn.4/l/Rev. 1,
p. 19 (Feb. 10, 1949).
90
See McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy; A Contemporary
Conception, 82 Recueil des Cours 137 (1953) (speaking of a hierarchy of
participants in the "world community"). See also Farran, The Sovereign
Order of Malta in International Law, 3 Int'l and Comp. L. Q. 217 (1954).
91
Silving, Nationality in Comparative Law, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 410
(1956).
54
92
one being a compensation for the other."
In answering the question of whether a given organization has
achieved the status of an international public body, empirical tests
rather than abstract formulae must be applied. As Professor Hersh
Lauterpacht has put it, "in each particular case the question of
whether a person or a body is a subject of international law must
be answered in a pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience
and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a preconceived
93
notion as to who can be subjects of international law." While
admittedly corporations (and other transnational entitles) are not
usually considered to be subjects of international law, an analysis
of the role they play in the world community and the manner in which
people adhere to them, while simultaneously clinging to their formal
allegiances to nation-states, tends to indicate that a concept of
dual citizenship is being created.
Proof of such a proposition would require knowledge beyond
that presently available, knowledge not only about what the MNEs
do in fact insofar as planetary decision-making is concerned, but
also about the psychology—the motivations, the preferences, the
values—of individual members of the sociological communities called
the corporations. The first requirement will be deferred until the
next section. As for the second, data are simply nonexistent. At
most, a tentative hypothesis can be advanced about the concept of
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corporate citizenship. Surely, however, it is a possible implication
of the multiplicity of subjects of international law that loyalties
94
of identifiable human beings are also multiple. That is what is
suggested here.
I do not mean to imply that duality of citizenship means that
state and enterprise are equal—whatever that may mean—in fact. The
nation-state, speaking generically, is still the dominant organ in
world affairs (certainly it is the most visible), but that should not
be taken to mean that the situation will continue or that the nation
will eventually win out in any struggle for power between it and the
MNE. Already suggested above is the notion that sovereignty is
divided in the world community and the idea that citizenship is dual.
Attention is now turned to the last of the three political consequences
of economic power that were singled out for attention—the growing
fusion of the political power of the nations and the economic power
of the MNEs.
The Corporate State
The 20th century, it has been well said, is the century of
corporativism. Indigenous to Europe, it is now spreading elsewhere.
The United States is not immune from the development. It has become,
if not truistic, at least common, so to term the U.S.A.
That, however, is an analysis of the internal politico-economic
94See McDougal, Lasswell and Reisman, The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. Legal Ed. 253 (1967) (describing
five participants or subjects, including the nation-state).
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order. May the same propositions be advanced insofar as matters
external to the nation-state are concerned, in, that is, the "world
95
community"? To answer that question requires insight into the
manner in which political and economic power come together—now,
in the past, and in the future. It is their interactions that are
the core of corporativism.
In order to be able to visualize the form that planetary
corporativism takes (or has taken and will take, depending on the
tense one employs), it is useful to consider the fundamental aspects
of the domestic corporate state. These will be briefly stated, but
with the caveat that it is recognized that complex matters are being
dealt with, matters that do not lend themselves to simplification.
A beginning may be made with a statement made in 1931 by lawyer Adolf
Berle and economist Gardiner Means:
The rise of the modern corporation has brought a
concentration of economic power which can cope on equal
terms with the modern state—economic power versus
political power, each strong in its own field. The
state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation,
while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful,
seeks independence and not infrequently endeavors to
avail itself, through indirect influence, of governmental
95The term is placed in quotation marks simply because of my
belief that there is no such thing as a global community, except on the
very highest level of abstraction—at which point the concept of
community becomes meaningless. Cf. R. Nisbet, supra note 87 passim.
96Quoted from the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, in J. Commons,
The Economics of Collective Action 58-9 (1950). Berle and Means make
the same point in their minor classic, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932) and it was repeated by Berle many times—for example,
in Berle, Coherency and the Social Sciences, in People, Power, and
Politics 10 (E. Gould and L. Steele eds. 1961).
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power. Not impossibly the economic organism, now typified by
the corporation, may win equality with the state and perhaps
even supersede it as the dominant institution of social
organization. The law of corporations, accordingly, might
well be considered as a potential constitutional law for
the new economic state; while business practice assumes
many of the aspects of administrative government.
If from that statement is extracted the phrase, ". . . the corporation
[both] seeks independence and not infrequently endeavors to avail
itself, through indirect influence, of governmental power. . .," then
the germ of the view of American corporativism may be seen. It is,
however, a two-way street, for the state seeks to employ the
corporation for its ends. The resulting relationship, when one
strips the veneer off of it, is a symbiosis; each entity—enterprise
and state—needs the other and uses the other. Indeed it would be
difficult to visualize either existing without the other, if one
views only the United States.
One other view is worth noting at the outset—Franz Neumann's
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statement that: "The significance of political power must be
squarely faced. No society in recorded history has ever been able
to dispense with political power. This is as true of liberalism as
of absolutism, as true of laissez faire as of an interventionist
state. No greater disservice has been rendered to political science
than the statement that the liberal state was a 'weak' state. It was
precisely as strong as it needed to be in the circumstances." What
that means is that the corporate state, American style, should be
viewed as a product of history. There has always been a closer
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relationship between state and enterprise than the American mythology,
particularly that purveyed by the Supreme Court, maintained. As Dean
Eugene V. Rostov once put it, "the line between public and private
98
action is blurred, and always has been blurred, in American law."
That development, over the decades, may be seen both in private
and public law. As for the former, it is familiar learning that tort
and contract principles were employed by judges (the principal lawmakers
of the 19th and early 20th centuries) in ways to further and protect
the growth of industrial enterprise. The point has been put in
another place by the present writer: The need exists "to look beyond
the facade of law and the political system to determine who benefits,
and how, from that system. If politics, as Harold Lasswell has said,
is a question of who gets what, where, when, and how, then judge-made
private law—ostensibly normatively neutral and a product of a
jurisprudential cosmology, attributed to Blackstone, that spoke in
terms of eternal verities entirely divorced from the muck and mire
of ordinary human affairs—historically helped to settle a number of
these questions. In sum, it helped the corporations; if we want to
be charitable, we can say that it was for the achievement of some
99
public end.
That protecting blanket of private law was accompanied by a set
of public law (constitutional) doctrines created by the Supreme Court
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in the post-Civil War period. Not only were corporations found to
be persons within the meaning of the protections afforded by the due
process clauses, those clauses were in effect rewritten by the Court
so as to strike down adverse legislation dealing with industrial
relations. If we consider the Supreme Court to be an instrument
of governance, which it surely is, and that it renders decisions for
reasons other than Blackstone's quaint jurisprudential notions, then
we may perceive a corpus of public law that insulated the companies
from the pressures of a rising trade-union movement, Populism, and
Grangerism.
That period of judicial protection was supplanted in 1937 and
ensuing years by an unannounced but definite high degree of
deference accorded to the political branches of government in their
economic policy decisions. After the Court had struck down the
101
National Recovery Act of 1933, an overt attempt to engraft a form
of corporativism upon the political economy, it soon stood aside and
found no barriers in the fundamental law to the creation of an
indigenous corporativism by slow accretion of congressional statutes,
executive actions, administrative rulings, and a patina of custom and
usage that have created a set of narrowly based elites, made up of
both private citizens and public officials, that control increasingly
The history is outlined in A. Miller, supra note 80, and in
McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court; An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Supreme Court Review 34.
Not, however, because it was a form of corporativism, but
for other reasons. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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large segments of policy.
This means that a new politico-economic order is in process of
102becoming, a "group-person" (to use Gierke's label) that at once
transcends the arithmetical sum of its parts, which are the public
group of government and the private group of the corporations (and
other important social organizations). The shorthand term for this
is the corporate state. It has at least the following elements:
(1) the merger, actual or tacit, between political and economic
power; (2) a legal nexus between the two forms of power; (3) the
consequence of some type of corporate body that both encompasses
the two and is greater than the arithmetical sum of the two; and
(4) a diminution of the social and legal role of the individual qua
individual. Time and space permit discussion of only the second—
the question of how in legal theory the fusion of the two types of
103
social power can be said to have taken place.
Some nations have answered that question by enacting statutes
or by executive fiat; examples include Italy under Mussolini and
Spain under Franco. For a nation such as the United States the
answer is much more difficult. Required is a "living law" analysis,
104
in the Ehrlichian sense, which requires: (1) focus on the important
102See 0. von Gierke, supra note 73, discussed in Miller, supra
note 2.
For fuller discussion, see my Journal of Economic Issues
article, supra note 2, and my forthcoming The Modern Corporate State:
An Essay in Constitutional Theory (unpublished book manuscript).
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societal decisions and asking the question: Who makes those decisions,
how, and with what effects? (2) a distinction between those who
exercise formal authority to make such decisions and those who
exercise effective control over them; (3) a knowledge of the factors
that influence or control given decisions; and (4) an appreciation
of what difference decisions make in the social structure.
Such large and difficult questions can be given only summary
treatment here. The basic idea proffered is that important societal
decisions tend more and more to be made by an amalgam of the inter-
actions of public and private bureaucracies. Quite often, but not
always, these decisions—they are matters of important public
policy—are put into official form through the formal authority of
government officials. (This is not always so, for perhaps equally
often corporate managers can do so, but only with express or tacit
delegation of authority from the state, the state having what
Wolfgang Friedmann once termed a "reserve function.") The flow
of decisions thus made, which often are administrative rather than
legislative or judicial, constitute the living law. They need not,
it should be noted, be formalized in administrative rule or
legislative enactment; they are, to vary the terminology of John R.
Commons, the "working rules" of American corporativism.
The living law is principally associated with Eugen Ehrlich, the
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Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and
the Law, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 155 (1957).
J. Commons, Legal Foundations of Capitalism (1924) passim.
62
Austrian jurisprudent who wrote The Fundamental Principles of the
Sociology of Law several decades ago. Ehrlich maintained that the
living law is to be seen in contrast to that which is in force
merely in the courts and with the officials. The living law, to him,
is law that is not imprisoned in formal rules of law, but which
nevertheless dominates life itself. To find it, one must be privy
to not only the orthodox legal research materials, but also the study
of life itself, of commerce, of customs and usage, and of the several
types of organizations, both those recognized by formal law and those
that are disapproved by that law. In other words, the living law is
the flow of authoritative decisions, in the McDougal sense, ' but
with the decisions emanating both from the public and the private
bureaucracies. It is what the important decision-makers actually do;
it is a process, a flow of decisions rather than a static system.
The black-letter rules are important and necessary, but are only a
part of the picture—a datum, a point of departure for more meaningful
analysis. The myriad routine transactions between the two characteristic
institutions of the day—big government and big business—make up a
body of living law. At times it is made overt in statute, administrative
ruling, or even judicial decision, but not always or even mostly.
This is particularly true of the "how" of decision-making, the
procedure by which decisions are made; it, too is law in the sense used
here.
See, for example, McDougal, Law as a Process of Decision,
1 Natural L. Forum 53 (1956).
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What is suggested is that a system of law exists within the United
States, which consists of the informal transactions between government
and pluralistic social groups—in present inquiry, the corporations.
Although at times it is formalized, more often it exists as a set of
working rules which are understood by the participants, but which
seldom get a formal imprimatur, or, for that matter, which are often
kept secret from all except a select few. This system is not
necessarily cohesive and consistent; it is a series of laws, rather
than a logical whole. It is the means by which the various sub-
governments within Washington operate. This complex web of informal
interactions constitutes what, with Ehrlich, is called the living law
of American corporativism. If the notion is valid, then it effects
the legal nexus between the corporation and the state. It is law in
that it enables power to be exercised, and it is invisible law in that
it is not codified or otherwise entombed in the musty volumes of law
libraries. Commons's "working rules" appear to approximate this
view; for example, he speaks of the corporation charter as a
group of promises and commands which the state makes in
the form of working rules indicating how the officials
of the state shall act in the future in matters affecting
the association, the members of the association, and the
persons not members. It is these promises and commands,
or working rules, of officials which constitute the
charter and determine the status of the association. . . .
This collective, intangible living process of individuals,
the functionaries of the state find already in a
trembling existence and then proceed "artificially" to
guide the individuals concerned and give it a safer
existence. The guidance is made through promising
to them a certain line of behavior on the part of
public officials, which sets forth the limits on their
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private behavior and the assistance they may expect on
the part of public officials.108
Within the American constitutional system, that "assistance" about
which Commons speaks is subject .to the highest degree of discretion
on the part of public officials, the constitutional and statutory
law of delegation of legislative power having invested the
bureaucracy with uncontrolled governing power—uncontrolled in the
109
sense of interdictory rules of law. (Ours is emphatically a
government of men, not of laws, says Washington lawyer Charles
Horsky—and that it is, with the "superlawyers" in Washington
operating as power brokers between business and government.)
So much for prologue on the concept of corporativism. Can the
same notions be applied to the larger-than-national scheme? The
(admittedly) tentative answer is in the affirmative, coupled with the
caveat that much research must be conducted in order to produce
verified data that would validate such an hypothesis. Enough evidence
is now available, however, for the state-centered view of world
politics and world law to be an outdated paradigm; so much is shown
in the seminal volume, Transnational Relations and World Politics,
edited by Professors Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
108
Commons, supra note 106.
109
Cf. K. Davis, Discretionary Justice; A Preliminary Inquiry (1969)
See C. Horsky, The Washington Lawyer (1972); J. Goulden,
The Superlawyers (1972).
Published in 1972.
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As Seyom Brown, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, has said:.
"The cumulative picture that emerges is one of governments losing their
controlling influence over important transnational flows of people,
material, money, and ideas, while other organizations—corporations,
professional and trade associations, quasi-governments—gain in ability
to allocate resources, privileges, and penalties across national
boundaries." At least three implications may be drawn from this:
(1) the state-centered paradigm of world politics, which focuses on
the strategies, capabilities, and interactions of nation-states, is
no longer valid; indeed, it never was entirely valid, but it is becoming
less so; (2) the nation-states do not (and will not) necessarily prevail
over private transnational interests should conflicts occur; the
orthodox assumption is that the nation-state will win out; the point,
however, is not the ultimate power of the state in such clashes but
whether the cumulative power of the transnational private interests
often intimidate, and thus dominate, the very governmental agencies
that purportedly regulate them; and (3) it is not necessarily valid
to maintain that creation of a single global economy within which goods
and services can be exchanged freely on the basis of comparative
advantage would be the optimum way of allocating the world's resources;
despite the belief that it is, it may well be that "the transnationally
113
mobile are rewarded at the expense of the nationally mobile." In
112Brown, A Study of Conglomerate Powers That Transcend Nations,
Saturday Review, May 20, 1972, p. 64.
113Keohane and Nye supra note 111.
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short, a just world order gradually evolving out of expanding socio-
economic intercourse, made possible by new transportation and
communications technologies, might well increase conflict rather than
114
eliminate it.
Be that as it may (it is put forth merely for purposes of
conjecture), the implication of this too-brief analysis is that the
rise of the MNEs is a post-colonial form of private economic
imperialism. As Peter B. Evans said, "With the growing predominance
of the multinational corporation, increasing numbers of a poor
country's economic actors become responsible to superiors and stock-
holders who are citizens of other countries. If a similar chain of
command existed in public organizations, the poor country would be
deemed a colony." Even affluent countries, such as Canada, can be
subjected to this type of neocolonialism. And the further impli-
cation is that the MNE quite often, although not always, is the
"chosen instrument" of the powerful nation-state (such as the United
114
Brown, supra note 112.
Evans, National Autonomy and Economic Development: Critical
Perspectives on Multinational Corporations in Poor Countries, in
Keohane and Nye, supra note 111, at 325.
"The international corporations have evidently declared
ideological war on the 'antiquated' nation-state. . . . The charge that
materialism, modernization and internationalism is the new liberal
creed of corporate capitalism is a valid one. The implication is
clear: the nation-state as a political unit of democratic decision-
making must, in the interest of 'progress,' yield control to the new
mercantile mini-powers." Levitt, The Hinterland Economy, 50 Canadian
Forum 163 (July-Aug. 1970). See K. Levitt, Silent Surrender (1970);
Cox, Labor and Transnational Relations, in Keohane and Nye, supra
note 111, at 204.
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States). But the analogue ±s also noteworthy: As Professor Dennis
M. Ray has said, quite often corporations can shape the evironment
in which the problems of American foreign relations grow and can also
define the "axiomatic." "Axiomatic decisions," says Ray, "are those
which are virtually automatic; those actions by government which no
longer require explicit means-ends calculations and, indeed, are
118
rarely accompanied by debate ..." For example, it is "axiomatic"
that the U.S. government should intervene to protect American life
and property abroad. But whose life and whose property? And why?
To what ends? If Jack Anderson's expose of ITT's covert activities
in Chile, carried on with the help of the American government, are
119
even partially correct, then there is hard evidence of business-
government collaboration in the "world community." Another name for
it would be corporativism, American style.
It is, in sum, more than an a priori hypothesis that the MNEs
and the state are often partners in fact, if not in theory. They
ride on a bicycle built for two, with the unanswered question being
who is doing the steering. Compare in this regard the statement of
As in the airlines industry, and also in international
communications.
-I 10
Ray, Corporations and American Foreign Relations, 403 Annals
80 (Sept. 1972).
119A new subcommittee, headed by Senator Frank Church, of the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has been established and will
inquire inter alia into the political impact of the multinational
corporations in the developing countries. Cf. Miller, The Global
Corporation and American Constitutionalism; Some Political Consequences
of Economic Power, 6 J. Int'l L. and Econ. 235 (1972).
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Professor Robert Gilpin with that of former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense Arthur Barber; says Gilpin: "... the role of the nation-
state in economic as well as in political life is increasing and . . .
the multinational corporation is actually a stimulant to the further
120
extension of state power in the economic realm"; Barber maintains
that the MNE is "bringing an end to middle class society and the
121dominance of the nation-state." Just as the East India Company was,
while privately owned and operated for the profit of shareholders, in
122
effect an instrument of the British government, so too are the
Fords and IBMs and Mitsuis and Unilevers and other corporate giants
of the modern age.
That view, however, is being contested by some corporate officials,
who are beginning to think in terms of "anational" corporations. "We
appear," said Carl A. Gerstacker, chairman of the board of Dow Chemical
Company, in early 1972, "to be moving strongly in the direction of
what will not be really multinational or international companies as we
know them today, but what we might call 'anational' companies—
123
companies without any nationality, belonging to all nationalities."
120Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,
in Keohane and Nye, supra note 111, at 48.
121
Barber, quoted in Galloway, Worldwide Corporations and
International Integration: The Case of INTELSAT. 24 Int'l Org. 506 (1970),
122See J. Gardner, The East India Company (1972); see also
Heilbroner, The Multinational Corporation and the Nation-State, New
York Rev., Feb. 11, 1971, -. 23.
123Jensen, Worldwide Companies Outgrow Nations, N. Y. Times,
Feb. 13, 1972, Sec. 3, p. 1.
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If that should take place—the main obstacle now is the American tax
laws—then corporations would no longer be instruments of American
policy; they would be free from the laws of any nation save those in
which they did business. No longer, says Gerstacker, would his
company have to comply with United States law concerning his operations
outside the United States. To achieve anationalism it would be
necessary to incorporate in some principality, such as Monaco, or
perhaps on some tiny island in the Caribbean. Admittedly, however,
this is not a present fact. It would be difficult, perhaps impossible,
to predict the success of the drive for denationalizing the corporation.
No doubt it would be strenuously resisted by the political leaders
and, quite possibly, by the trade unions. Nationality of corporations,
however, is at best a nebulous legal concept, and has become more so
124
with ownership of shares being held by citizens of many nation-states.
There is, furthermore, a strong reason for the corporation to
retain ties to a nation-state such as the United States. As a
superpower that, for better or worse, is the dominant political entity
in the world, the U.S. can through one means or another provide
protections to corporations that they cannot themselves develop. There
is, in other words, a reciprocal need of the two—corporation and
nation-state—for each other. Through various techniques, including
the use of violence, the political order can protect the property and
assets of the companies. The price for that is paid through taxation
124
Cf. Miller, The Corporation as a Private Government in the World
Community, 46 Va. L. Rev. 1539 (1960).
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and such regulation as can be effected. In the resolution of the
conflicts between the two forms of social order—political and
economic—a system of symbiotic cooperation and close partnership
is likely to be the result; at times that cooperation may appear
antagonistic, but only sporadically. The basic pattern will be
for the corporation and the state to be the two sides of one coin;
neither could exist in the modern world without the other.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is enough now to summarize: Technology plus Organization
equals the multinational enterprise (in brief, T + 0 = MNE), but only
by permitting its existence, not requiring it. The MNE and the
nation-state are the major participants in the planetary order; the
enterprise has a political role and the state has an economic role;
they are conjoined ever increasingly into a system of global
corporativism. Only by an act of faith, not necessarily self-
evident, can one believe that the "public interest"—that is, the
interests of all the peoples of the world—will result from this
fusion of power. Much more likely, the rich will get richer and
125
the poor will get poorer. If that be so, then the MNE is a
technique to further the economic well-being of the already affluent
nation-states of the planet.
1 ?S
Cf. G. Myrdal, Asian Drama (1968); B. Ward, The Rich Nations
and the Poor Nations (1962); P. Worsley, The Third World (1964).
72
STANDARD TITLE PAGE
FOR TECHNICAL REPORTS
4. Title and Subtitle
1: Report No. GWPS-MON 14 3. Recipient 's Catalog No.
TECHNOLOGY,
THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATION,
AND THE NATION-STATE: A Speculative Essay
5- Report Date
October 1972
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s) Arthur Selwyn MILLER 8- Performing Organization Rept.No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Program of Policy Studies in Science & Technology
The George Washington University
2100 Pennsylvania Avenue; N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20006
10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.
11. Contract/Grant No.
NASA NGL 09-010-030
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W.
Washingtonj D. C. 20546
13. Type of Report & Period
Covered
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
16. Abstracts
This study deals with two exceedingly complex matters; first, the causal
connection, if any, between technology and the rise of giant transnational
or multinational corporations, and second, the impact that that development
is having on the political order called the nation-state. It is concluded
that the multinational enterprise and the nation-state are the major
participants in the planetary order; that the enterprise has a political role
and the state has an economic role; and that they are conjoined ever
increasingly into a system of global corporativism.
17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors
Corporations 0503
Political Systems 0504
Economic development 0503
Global communication 1702
17b. Identif iers/Open-Ended Terms
Technology
Global corporativism
17c. COSATi Field/Group
18. Di s t r ibu t ion Statement Releasable to public without
limitation. Initial distribution from Program of
Policy Studies; all subsequent copies from NTIS.
19. Security Class (This
Report)
UNCLASSIFIED
20. Security Class (This
Page
UNCLASSIFIED
21. No. of Pages
75
22. Pri$3,00
FORM CFSTI-35 (4-70) USCOMM-DC 65003-P70
